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Condominium Associations: Living under
the Due Process Shadow*
BRIAN L. WEAKLAND**
I. INTRODUCTION
Within an area bounded by four walls, a ceiling and a floor, the
condominium unit owner dwells. He has paid tens of thousands of
dollars for the right to occupy this space. Beyond these walls are
other areas which he may own but cannot exclusively possess.
Within the walls, his activities are circumscribed by rules made by
others. The owner's existence in this place is based on intricate and
intertwined legal relationships that the law has yet to fully define.
Such is the conundrum of those who choose to buy condominium
units. What appears to be a fee interest in property often behaves
like nothing more than a much-fettered I right of possession. The con-
dominium form of ownership, touted as convenient, maintenance-free
and economical, is also a Gordian knot :of frustrating legal complex-
ity. Many of us would more readily comprehend Einstein's theory of
a finite universe than understand precisely where an owner's unit be-
gins and ends. Moreover, because the Owner's three different forms
of ownership - fee, common and limited common - carry different
prescribed rules of use, the owner must observe where his feet are
located before he determines how to act.
State condominium statutes, case law and the individual condomin-
ium's documents, of course, provide much guidance for the unit
owner who strives to understand his "lot in life." The statutes, which
vary from state to state,' permit various property interests to be cre-
ated by dedicating land to the condominium form of ownership. Case
* The author is grateful for the assistance 6f Wayne S. Hyatt, Esq., of Hyatt &
Rhoads, P.C., Atlanta, Ga. and Professor Cyril Fox of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law in the preparation of this article.
** Associate, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa.; B.A., The Pennsylvania
State University, 1975; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1984; and a condo-
minium unit owner.
1. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-110, 7 U.L.A. 421 (1985). The
law attempts to define the legal relationships arising among and be-
tween unit owners, the condominium association, the condominium
board of directors and the condominium developer. The documents,
including the condominium declaration, bylaws and rules, serve as an
owner's manual, explaining how the condominium operates and
describing what the owner must do to ensure that the operation will
be successful.
However, statutes, case law interpreting the statutes and the con-
dominium documents alone do not completely oversee the operation
of a condominium. Courts have employed a gap-filling device for
resolving condominium disputes, because condominiums depend on
the cooperation of the unit owners and because breakdowns invaria-
bly result in any situation where more than one person is involved.
Using the rule of reasonableness,2 the court examines the conduct of
the unit owner or association and determines whether that conduct is
reasonable in a condominium setting. This device, which is not really
a rule at all, allows the court to substitute its concepts of how people
should act in a condominium, a practice that necessarily counte-
nances ad hoc decisions by the court. Condominium case law hold-
ings are usually limited to the facts of the case, do not carry the
heavy baggage of legal precedent and are not consistent from juris-
diction to jurisdiction because the rule is applied on a case by case
basis.
One obvious problem created by the rule of reasonableness as a
legal concept is the uncertainty arising from these case by case appli-
cations of the rule. Condominium unit owner associations rarely can
be absolutely sure that their actions will be viewed as reasonable by
the court. Attorneys specializing in condominium law are continually
frustrated by their inability to counsel their clients with certainty
and confidence. In addition, the unit owner, whose fighting cause
may be to plant tomatoes in his limited common area or to protect
his dog from the clutches of an association board that seeks to en-
force a "no pets" covenant, often has only the vague and ethereal
rule of reasonableness as a guardian of his property rights.
Lurking above the rule of reasonableness, the statutes and the con-
dominium documents, is the United States Constitution. When an as-
sociation takes action affecting the basic liberty and property rights
of its unit owners, fundamental constitutional concerns arise, specifi-
cally the rights of due process and equal protection. This article ex-
Act has been adopted in Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and West Virginia. Id.
2. For an explanation of the rule of reasonableness and the constitutional impli-
cations of association actions, see Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State
Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Development, 19 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1984).
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amines the proper role of the Constitution in the operation of
condominiums. It will explain forms of association governance, with
an emphasis on whether the association has "government" attributes,
and whether state action is present solthat due process protections
should apply in the condominium setting. Finally, the article will
conclude that the rule of reasonableness should comport with the law
of due process when an association acts in a municipal capacity and
not when an association acts primarily to protect the investment in-
terests of its unit owners.
II. TRAITS OF THE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
The condominium form of real property ownership is a creature of
state statutes. The Uniform Condominium Act, which has been
adopted by a few states,3 gives broad-ranging powers to the unit own-
ers' association. Among these powers are: the power to adopt and
amend bylaws, rules and regulations, to adopt and amend budgets, to
collect assessments for common expenses from unit owners to hire
and fire managing agents, to institute or defend litigation, to make
contracts, to regulate the use and maintenance of common elements,
and to acquire and convey real property.4 Although the association
must look to state law for its powers, the powers conferred are ex-
pansive. With these powers, the association can govern fairly thor-
oughly the condominium development.
These powers can be restricted by the condominium declaration or
master deed. The declaration, which when recorded creates the con-
dominium, describes the size of the condominium, the number of
units and the real estate interests created.5 The declaration also es-
tablishes the condominium association which, in turn, enacts bylaws
to outline association procedures.6 The association promulgates rules
and regulations to manage the day-to-day operation of the develop-
ment and to promote harmony among the unit owners. 7 By agreeing
to the various covenants in the declaration (through his purchase of a
condominium unit), each unit owner impliedly consents to the rea-
sonable exercise of those powers by the association.8 Therefore, the
3. See supra note 1.
4. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-102 (1985).
5. I& § 2-101.
6. Id. § 3-101.
7. Id § 3-102(a)(1).
8. See, e.g., Raines v. Palm Beach Leisureville Community Ass'n, Inc., 413 So. 2d
30 (Fla. 1982).
association's powers are granted by the state law and defined through
the consent of unit owners. 9 As the Virginia Supreme Court held in
Unit Owners Association of BuildAmerica-1 v. Gillman:O
"The power exercised by the Association is contractual in nature
and is the creature of the condominium documents to which all unit
owners subjected themselves in purchasing their units. It is a power
exercised in accordance with the private concensus [sic] of the unit
owners.""l
The Gillman holding offers a good general explanation of condo-
minium governance. The reader should be careful not to rely too
heavily on contractual analysis. By agreeing to enter into a condo-
minium form of ownership, the unit owner is not consenting to have
his individual investment expectations protected by the association;
to the contrary, he is consenting to have the association protect the
investment expectations of the unit owners collectively. It is this
mutual interest that prevents the use of pure contract law analysis in
a condominium setting.
Another, and perhaps better, definition of the consensual relation-
ship between the unit owner and condominium association was given
in Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium Owners Association, Inc.12
There, the court held that condominium unit owners constitute a
democratic subsociety, necessarily more restrictive in the use of con-
dominium property than might be acceptable in more traditional
forms of property ownership. The court explained that "each constit-
uent must relinquish some degree of freedom of choice and agree to
subordinate some of his traditional ownership rights when he elects
this type of ownership experience."13
Without considering the "rule of reasonableness", the propriety of
association action in running the condominium can be examined by
using either contract law or constitutional law. The test is whether
the association is operating as a business (for contract law to apply)
or as a government (for constitutional law to be applied). One legal
commentator calls the condominium association "the obvious private
alternative to the city."14 While recognizing that municipalities are
considered "public" and condominium associations "private", "[o]nly
one important difference between the two forms of organization [is
discernible] - the sometimes involuntary nature of membership in a
9. Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assoc., 184 N.J. Super. 450, 446 A.2d 551 (1981), a]f'd,
184 N.J. Super. 442, 446 A.2d 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), rev'd in part, 93 N.J.
370, 461 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 395 (1983).
10. 223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982).
11. Id. at 766, 292 S.E.2d at 385.
12. 662 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
13. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
14. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1519
(1982).
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city versus the perfectly voluntary nature of membership in a home-
owners association."'L
As a result of this voluntariness, or the contractual nature of the
association-unit owner relationship, courts have treated the condo-
minium association as a business entity rather than a municipal cor-
poration. Indeed, the association in some jurisdictions may
incorporate, adopt corporate bylaws and, conduct business meetings in
the manner of any business corporation.16 In recent cases, the associ-
ation is viewed merely as a business entity and is held to those rights
and duties toward its residents that a commercial enterprise has to its
customers or, more specifically, that a landlord has to its tenants.
The litigation-plagued Village Green condominium project in Los
Angeles, California, perhaps illustrates this business relationship atti-
tude best. Village Green Condominiums contains 629 units over a 64-
acre tract in the Baldwin Hills area of Los Angeles. The project con-
sists of approximately ninety-two buildings, each containing several
condominium units. The buildings are situated around grassy, park-
like areas known as "courts." Village Green was operated as an
apartment complex until 1973 when it Was converted into condomin-
ium units. Village Green has been sued on two occasions by unit
owners, and both cases turned on whether the project was considered
a "business."
The first case, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association,17
considered whether the project could limit residency in the develop-
ment to persons over the age of 18 years. The case arose when John
and Denise O'Connor bought a two-bedroom unit in 1975 and four
years later had their first child, Gavin. Shortly after the child's birth,
the association gave the O'Connors written notice that the presence
of Gavin in the unit violated the covenants, conditions and restric-
tions of the development and directed 'them to live elsewhere. The
O'Connors filed suit against the association to have the age restric-
tion declared invalid under the Unruh Civil Rights Act of Califor-
nia.' 8 For the restriction to be declared invalid, the court first had to
find that the condominium was a "business establishment" under the
act. Noting that the term had a broad I definition under the act, the
court said:
15. Id. at 1520.
16. 1 A. FERRER, LAW OF CONDOMINIUM § 474 (1967).
17. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
18. Id. at 793, 662 P.2d at 428, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 51
(West 1982)).
The Village Green Owners Association has sufficient businesslike attributes to
fall within the scope of the act's reference to "business establishments of
every kind whatsoever." Contrary to the association's attempt to characterize
itself as but an organization that "mows lawns" for owners, the association in
reality has a far broader and more businesslike purpose .... In brief, the as-
sociation performs all the customary business functions which in the tradi-
tional landlord-tenant relationship, rest on the landlord's shoulders.1 9
The court also held that a "business establishment" does not have to
make a profit to be governed by the Unruh Act. It was sufficient
that the association's overall function was to protect and enhance the
project's economic value.20
The landlord-tenant model of O'Connor returned to haunt the Vil-
lage Green association in the second case, Troy v. Village Green Con-
dominium Project.21 In that case, a unit owner sued the association
for injuries sustained in a criminal assault that, she alleged, resulted
from the association's failure to provide adequate exterior lighting.22
During April 1980, a unit owned by Frances Troy was burglarized.
She asked the project manager to install more exterior lighting as
soon as possible. The association did not act on the request, and in
August 1980, Ms. Troy, frustrated by the inaction, installed addi-
tional exterior lighting for her own unit. Shortly thereafter, she was
informed that the exterior lighting violated the project's covenants,
conditions and restrictions and was installed without the association's
permission. She was told that the lighting must be removed by Octo-
ber sixth. Ms. Troy did not remove the lighting, and the association
19. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
20. I&
21. 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1983).
22. Id. at 139, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 682. Ironically, since the theme of this paper cen-
ters around the condominium and its similarities to a municipal corporation, it should
be noted that cities have historically had difficulties in providing street lighting. Ac-
cording to J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4
(5th ed. 1911) (quoting LANCIANI, ANCIENT ROME IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DISCOVER-
IES, Ch. 8 (1889)), the great cities of civilization were stymied by lack of public
illumination.
In ancient Rome, public places were not lighted. The principal cause of disor-
der was that the metropolis was kept in perfect darkness at night. Why the
idea of a system of public illumination was not conceived and adopted is a
mystery hard to solve. Excavations fully confirm the fact. Not a trace of a
bracket fixed to the front of a house, or of a rope or small chain drawn across
the street to support lamps or lanterns, has as yet been found, and probably
none ever will be.
J. DILLON, supra § 4. London in 1685 had a similar problem:
When the evening closed in, the difficulty and danger in walking about
London became serious indeed. The garret windows were opened, and pails
were emptied, with little regard to those passing below. Falls, bruises and
broken bones were of constant occurrence. For till the last year of the reign
of Charles II, most of the streets were left in profound darkness. Thieves and
robbers plied their trade with impunity; yet they were hardly so terrible as
another class of ruffians. It was a favorite amusement of dissolute young gen-
tlemen to swagger by night about the town, breaking windows, upsetting se-
dans, beating quiet men, and offering rude caresses to pretty women.
Id. § 4 n.1 (citing 1 T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, Ch. 2).
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board told her on October eighth that she would have to turn off the
circuit that fed the prohibited lighting. She complied with the re-
quest on October eighth, turned off the circuit and was left with no
exterior lighting whatsoever. That night, an intruder entered her
unit and raped and robbed her.
The court found that the association board was negligent in not
having sufficient exterior lighting once! it learned of criminal activity
in the project. The association's duty to exercise reasonable care for
the safety of unit owners was deemed to be the duty required of land-
lords for their tenants. As the court said,
[The board members] contend that it would be unfair to impose upon them a
duty to provide "expensive security measures" when they are not landlords in
the traditional sense but members of a homeowners' association which has
limited funds and cannot significantly increase its budget without the ap-
proval of a majority of the Association members. However, respondents are,
for all practical purposes, the Project's "landlords."'2 3
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the landlord-tenant
attributes of the Village Green association. The association was the
only entity in a position to maintain and secure the common areas of
the project. The association acted like a landlord when it so swiftly
rejected the exterior lighting installed by Ms. Troy. Also, the associa-
tion was responsible for the common areas and it was a management
body over which the individual owner had no effective control.24
This landlord-like treatment also was apparent in Admiral's Port
Condominium Association, Inc. v. Feldman,25 In this case, a unit
owner sued the association for not taking reasonable steps to guard
against crime after the owner's wife had been mugged in the condo-
minium parking lot. The court found no breach of duty because
there was no prior mugging in the parking lot which would have
made the crime foreseeable. 26
On the other hand, a court may not view the condominium ar-
23. Village Green Condominium Project, 149 Cal. 3d at 144, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
24. In Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), an association was
sued for pioviding more security for its residents. There, a unit owner sought an in-
junction to remove locks from exterior doors prbviding entry to the common passage-
ways of the condominium building, claiming they created an inconvenience and were a
nuisance. The court held that the installation was a reasonable exercise of the associa-
tion board of managers' authority where there were reports of vandalism and theft.
Id. at 198.
25, 426 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
26. Id. at 1055. Additional cases treating the association-unit owner relationship as
similar to the landlord-tenant relationship are:: Pratt v. Maryland Farms Condomin-
ium Phase 1, Inc., 42 Md. App. 632, 402 A.2d 105: (1979); Baum v. Coronado Condomin-
ium Ass'n, Inc., 376 So. 2d 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
rangement as a landlord-tenant relationship27 but rather as a govern-
ment-citizen relationship. However, a pure government approach is
difficult, due in part to the difficulty of defining municipal
government.
McQuillan's treatise on municipal corporations defines a public cor-
poration as "one that is created for political purposes only, with polit-
tcal powers to be exercised for purposes connected with the public
good in the administration of civil government, as distinguished from
a private corporation which is one created for purposes other than
those of government ... ,"28 Generally, McQuillan writes, "munici-
pal corporations" is a term that applies only to incorporated cities,
towns or villages invested with the power of local legislation.29 In de-
fining the traits of a municipal corporation, however, the treatise
could well be describing the condominium association:
1. Incorporation as such pursuant to the constitution of the state or to a
statute.
2. A charter.
3. A population and prescribed area within which the local civil government
and corporate functions are exercised ...
4. Consent of the inhabitants of the territory to the creation of the corpora-
tion, with certain exceptions.
5. A corporate name.
6. The right of local self-government. . [A] test as to whether an organiza-
tion is a municipal corporation, using that term in its strict sense, is
whether it has the power of local government as distinguished from
merely possessing powers which are merely executive and administrative
in their character .... The power to sue or be sued.
3 0
Unlike their treatment of condominium associations, courts generally
have treated municipal corporations as subordinate branches of state
government.3 1 For this reason, a municipal corporation has been var-
iously described as an arm of the state, a miniature state, an instru-
mentality of the state, a mere creature of the state, and an agency of
the state and the like. 32
The United States Supreme Court has defined a municipal corpora-
tion as a political subdivision of the state, created by the state legisla-
ture for the exercise of such governmental powers of the state as
may be entrusted to it as a unit of local government.3 3 This defini-
tion contains three elements, all of which can be satisfied by the con-
dominium association arrangement. First, the condominium form of
27. See, e.g., People v. Board of Managers, New City Condominium, 123 Misc. 2d
188, 474 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1984).
28. E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.03 (3d ed. 1971) (ci-
tations omitted).
29. 1d § 2.07.
30. I& § 2.07(b).
31. See, e.g., Knauer v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. Commw. 360, 332 A.2d 589 (1975)
(municipal corporations are "creatures of the state").
32. E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 28, § 2.08.
33. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 189 (1923).
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ownership is created by state statute. Second, the governing body of
the condominium, the association board, is popularly elected by unit
owners. And, third, the state entrusts to the board many powers of
self-government, including the power to levy assessments, the power
to regulate land use and the power to provide such municipal services
as water and sewer service, security and recreation.
Courts and scholars also point to the dual role of the municipal
corporation as: (1) to assist the government of the state as an agent or
arm of the state, and (2) to regulate and administer the local affairs
of the area incorporated for the benefit of the local community. 34
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this dual role:
[Municipal corporations] exercise powers which are governmental and powers
which are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal
corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by
delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. In the other character it is a
mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the
community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of
the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.3 5
It is difficult to enumerate exactly what governmental powers the
Court is addressing. In determining whether a particular organiza-
tion has the attributes of a government requiring the one person-one
vote standard of the equal protection clause,36 for example, the Court
looks to see if that body exercises "traditional" government powers
and provides "traditional" government services.3 7
One reason the condominium development probably should not be
viewed as a political subdivision or municipal corporation is the geo-
graphical overlap of a condominium situated within an already incor-
porated municipality. The legislature of the state may provide for
the organization of municipal corporations which embrace territory
situated wholly within the boundaries of another municipal corpora-
tion. However, the legislature cannot create two municipalities pos-
sessed of the same or similar powers, privileges and jurisdiction
34. C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW, §§ 1-2 (1957).
35. Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356 (1911).
36. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50 (1970);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
37. The prototype of today's collection of municipal services can be found in the
history of ancient Rome. The city provided itself with a magnificent water supply,
consisting of 14 aqueducts whose aggregate length, was 359 1/3 miles of which 304 miles
were underground. The city also constructed drains to carry off the sewage. Rome
had fire and police departments. Public baths could accommodate up to 62,800 citizens.
And the city had 18 public squares, 30 parks or gardens and eight large public recrea-
tion areas for foot races and gymnastics exercises. See J. DILLON, supra note 22, § 4.
covering the same territory at the same time.38 In other words, a
condominium cannot be considered as a general purpose government
if it is situated within an incorporated municipality having general
government powers. That is not to say that a condominium in such a
municipality could not be considered a special government, having
specialized powers and duties - a quasi-municipal corporation.
The public or quasi-municipal corporation is an arm of the state,
created for purposes of convenience of administering state-related
services.3 9 Entities such as school districts, sewer authorities and
transit authorities are quasi-municipal corporations and are not gen-
eral purpose governments. Nonetheless, these entities are created
under state law and serve important governmental interests. The
acts of these entities are considered "state action" for the purposes of
the fourteenth amendment. 40
While the condominium does not exercise express powers carved
out of the local government's general grant of powers, the condomin-
ium acts as a special government to those residents within its "juris-
diction."41 Several legal commentators prefer to label the
38. Town of Hornellsville v. City of Hornell, 38 A.D.2d 312, 328 N.Y.S.2d 941
(1972).
39. 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 6 (1982).
40. Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 436 U.S. 1 (1977); Brown v. D.C.
Transit Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975).
41. The condominium association is but one of several entities that have indicia of
municipal corporations. Consider the following three examples:
A. The community council. This model organization has been proposed
by government planners as a political action arm of local government. The community
council, a group of self-selected citizens at the neighborhood level, can assume a watch-
dog function over local government agencies, influence public opinion, claim the neigh-
borhood's share of services from the local city government and actually provide some
services, e.g., a housing relocation service, a homework-helper program and recreation
programs, such as Little League baseball. The community council also can effect polit-
ical change by acting as spokesman for its neighborhood before city council. See H.
WEISSMAN, COMMUNITY COUNCIL AND COMMUNITY CONTROL 145-47 (1970).
B. The community development organization. The federal Model Cities
Grant Program spawned many neighborhood groups which participated in the plan-
ning, funding and execution of urban redevelopment programs. This program has
since been displaced by the Community Development and Block Grant Program in
which the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development makes grants di-
rectly to units of local government for funding local community development pro-
grams. See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, APPRAISING HUD
STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1980).
C. The community development corporation. This corporation is a lo-
cally controlled tax-exempt corporation that receives money from government grants
and from the private sector. These corporations seek to increase jobs and income, and
to improve housing and to secure better services from local government, business and
utilities - envisioned as run by "strongly individualistic executives who have demon-
strated ability to devise programs, attract funds, inspire co-workers, earn the respect of
people in the community and harmonize conflicting forces." FORD FOUNDATION POL-
ICY PAPER, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 5-6 (May 1973).
A few such community development corporations have evolved to the point where
they could reasonably become local delivery mechanisms in a national program with
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condominium as a "quasi-government entity" not having specialized
powers, but rather general governmental powers on a miniature
scale. According to two commentators,
Upon analysis of the association's functions, one clearly sees the association
as a quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities of a municipal goverAment. As a "mini-government,"
the association provides to its members, in almost every case, utility services,
road maintenance, street and common area lighting, and refuse removal. In
many cases, it also provides security services and various forms of communica-
tion with the community. There is, moreover, a clear analogy to the munici-
pal police and public safety functions. All 'of these functions are financed
through assessments or taxes levied upon the members of the community,
with powers vested in the board of directors, council of co-owners, board of
managers, or other similar body clearly analogous to the governing body of a
municipality. 4
2
This governmental role, the commentators continued, creates a spe-
cial need to observe strictly the dictates of due process of law, a need
made more acute by two powers: the rule-making authority and the
assessment authority. 43
Some courts have adopted this rationale and viewed the condomin-
ium association as a government entity. A leading case is Cohen v.
Kite Hill Community Association.4 4 Kite Hill is located in the roll-
ing hills of Southern Orange County in California. It is a planned
residential community development fronting the Pacific Ocean, con-
sisting of about 900 homes, each costing $200,000 or more. The price
of a home depends in part on its view of the ocean. To preserve these
views, the homeowner association enforced various covenants and re-
strictions on the types of fences and the allowable height of fences
owners could construct. The association organized a five-member ar-
chitectural committee, composed of homeowners having no special
training in architecture, water runoff or geology. This committee re-
ceived plans for any landscape improvement projects and had the
power to approve plans before any construction could begin.
systematic aid from governmental sources. In fact, they are increasingly sought after
by government at all levels to act as its instrumrentality. For example, the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corp., with program activities totalling more then $25 million
annually, has a contract with New York City's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
to implement its ex-offender program. This corporation is the prime mover for city
and state financed day-care activities in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area and has agreed to
manage a substantial part of the government's inventory of abandoned buildings in
Bedford-Stuyvesant, N.Y. Id. at 6.
42. Hyatt and Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administra-
tion of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915,
918 (1976) (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983).
Shortly after the Cohens purchased their home, they submitted to
the architecture committee landscaping plans for their front and rear
yards. One part of the plan approved by the committee was a stone
and wrought iron fence (a two-foot stone base topped by a three-foot
iron fence). The Declaration of Kite Hill designated this style of
fence for use in a lot such as the Cohens'. Shortly thereafter, the Co-
hens' neighbors, the Ehles, received committee approval to build a
nonconforming solid stone fence, which partially obstructed the Co-
hens' view. The Cohens sued the association for allowing this breach
of covenant and for breaching its fiduciary duty to them.
After noting the great powers the Kite Hill association was given
by its Declaration, the court said the committee's action in approving
the Ehles' plan must be reviewed by the same standard used to re-
view municipal zoning variances.
The Kite Hill Community Association's approval of a fence not in conformity
with the Declaration is analogous to the administrative award of a zoning vari-
ance. In the zoning context as well as here, a departure from the master plan
in the Declaration stands to affect most adversely those who hold rights in
neighboring property. Hence, what the California Supreme Court has stated
with regard to judicial review of grants of variances applies equally well to the
Association's actions herein: "Courts must meaningfully review grants of var-
iances in order to protect the interests of those who hold rights in property
nearby the parcel for which a variance is sought."'4 5
The court then defined its role as a guardian of neighboring property
interests from arbitrary actions by homeowner associations. Further,
the court described as "nonsense" the association's argument that
committee approval of landscape improvement plans could be arbi-
trary as to an individual homeowner, as long as the action was rea-
sonable in light of the overriding interests of the homeowner
community.46 The court said: "Like any community, Kite Hill con-
sists of individual members who form in the aggregate an organic
whole. Thus, like any government, the Association must balance in-
dividual interests against the general welfare."47 These governmental
traits of the association give rise to a high standard of responsibility,
according to the court:
The business and governmental aspects of the association and the association's
relationship to its members clearly give rise to a special sense of responsibility
upon the officers and directors .... This special responsibility is manifested
in the requirements of fiduciary duties and the requirements of due process,
equal protection, and fair dealing.4 8
At least in reviewing land use controls by associations,49 the Kite Hill
45. Id. at 652-53, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15 (quoting Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Com-
munity v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 517-18, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836, 843 (1974)).
46. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 653, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
47. Id. at 652-653, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 651, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (quoting Hyatt and Rhoads, supra note 42, at
921).
49. For a collection of cases dealing with adequacy and application of guidelines
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court does not distinguish associations from municipal corporations.
Other courts also have seen no distinction between the two in the
area of rule enforcement. In Chateau Village North Condominium v.
Jordan,50 the association promulgated a rule that "[n]o cats, dogs, or
other animal . . . shall be kept . . . in the development unless the
same in each instance is expressly permitted in writing by the [man-
agement]." 51 The plaintiff, wishing to keep two cats in her unit,
sought and was denied permission. She filed suit, charging that the
association had an unstated policy not to permit any pets in the de-
velopment. After finding the rule's language to be discretionary and
not mandatory, the court treated the association as a government en-
tity and found that it abused its discretion in having a blanket prohi-
bition of pets. "[T]he Association had the duty to consider her
application and apply its discretion in a reasonable and good faith
manner."
52
In Michaels v. Galaxy Towers,53 the court reviewed the reasonable-
ness of a fine imposed on a unit owner who had violated a condomin-
ium rule. The owner had refused to give to the association board a
duplicate key to his unit as per the rule. For this refusal, the unit
owner incurred a daily fine, which totalled $1,100 when the case was
heard. The court held that this fine was unreasonable because it ex-
ceeded any amount necessary to ensure compliance. In other words,
the punishment did not fit the crime, and the fine exceeded the po-
lice power authority of local government.
Again, whether purposefully or accidentally, courts sense a parallel
between the government-citizen relationship and the association-unit
owner relationship. 54 Because of this parallel, courts are applying lo-
relating to condominium associations' requisite approval of an individual unit owner's
improvements or decorations, see Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4th 1059 (1983).
50. 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 792.
53. Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancellory Division, Hudson County, Docket
No. C19283 (1983).
54. Once again, this result may stem from the difficulty in defining a governmen-
tal entity. Consider the definition offered by Professor Frank Michelman, a recog-
nized scholar on community governance:
We know perfectly well, granting that there are intermediate hard cases, how
to distinguish governmental from non-governmental powers and forms of or-
ganization: governments are distinguished by their acknowledged, lawful au-
thority - not dependent on property ownership - to coerce a territorially
defined and imperfectly voluntary membership by acts of regulation, taxation,
and condemnation, the exercise of which authority is determined by
majoritarian and representative procedures.
cal government law to the field of condominium law. The next sec-
tion will illustrate how the application of government law to the
condominium context implicates fourteenth amendment rights and
obligations for the association and the unit owner.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE ASSOCIATION
The rights guaranteed to the citizens of the states have their basis
in the fourteenth amendment. Under this amendment, a citizen's
fundamental rights, such.as those listed in the Bill of Rights, cannot
be abridged by state action.55 The amendment's due process clause is
today probably the greatest single limitation upon the states and mu-
nicipal government. 56 It limits the actions taken by a state's legisla-
tive, judicial and executive branches.57 Specifically what actions are
proscribed by the clause have not been listed. The fact that the due
process clause has always evaded definition is perhaps the strongest
evidence that the protections secured are general rather than spe-
cific.5S In condominium association cases, the courts have applied
general due process limitations on association actions and, to some
extent, have considered the protection of another clause of the four-
teenth amendment - the equal protection clause.
A. Substantive Due Process
While the due process clause incorporates such rights as freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the right against self-incrimination, the ap-
plication of due process constraints in the condominium association
context deals with the reasonableness of association action. It is here
that the "rule of reasonableness" employed by the courts takes on its
constitutional clothing. Courts review the association action to deter-
mine if the action deprives the individual unit owner of liberty of
property unreasonably, arbitrarily, capriciously or by an abuse of
lawful discretion, i.e., without substantive due process of law. The
action can be reviewed through a three-part test, which is pervasive
in constitutional law:
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977) (emphasis in original).
This thoughtful, well-crafted definition can apply to the condominium association.
The condominium is territorially defined, its membership is imperfectly voluntary, and
a body elected by the majority exercises acts of regulation. However, membership is
"dependent on property ownership."
55. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
56. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 385 (2d ed. 1969).
57. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930).
58. R. MoTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 237 (1973).
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1. Does the unit owner have a fundamental property or liberty in-
terest that is being infringed by the association's action?
2. Is the association's action reasonably related to a legitimate goal
of the condominium development, eig., providing for the security
of residents, preserving property values by maintaining the com-
mon areas, etc.?
3. Are the means taken by the association in furthering that legiti-
mate end the least restrictive of thle unit owner's property and
liberty interests?
As the court held in Kite Hill,59 the test is a balancing one, weighing
the interests of the individual unit owner against the interests of the
community of unit owners.60
A good example of this balancing can be found in Makeever v.
Lyle.61 Dr. Lyle purchased a unit in a '16-unit condominium located
adjacent to the Yuma Golf and Country Club in Yuma, Ariz. All
units were built on ground level in blocks of four. Dr. Lyle wanted
to construct a second story consisting of two bedrooms, a bath and a
den, and also to add a basement workshop directly underneath his
carport. After receiving approval from ten of the sixteen unit own-
ers, he began the construction. Two other unit owners sued to enjoin
the construction, arguing that the doctor was appropriating to him-
self the exclusive use and control of cubic airspace belonging in com-
mon to all owners. The court agreed. Noting that the condominium
declaration permitted alterations upon approval of a majority of unit
owners, the court held that a majority cannot deprive an individual
of his property interest in the common area. In this case, the council
of unit owners' approval of the second floor addition constituted a
"taking" of the plaintiffs' property interest in the common area. As
the court said,
It is recognized that the council of co-owners must have broad powers in de-
termining and managing the common uses of the general common elements,
and such determinations will be upheld if they are not arbitrary and capri-
cious, bearing no reasonable relationship to the fundamental condominium
concept. . . . However, in our opinion the power of the council of co-owners
to actually convert the common general elements to the exclusive and private
use and control of one of the individual owners constitutes a taking of the
other remaining individual owners' property .62
59. 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (i983).
60. Cf Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (general public interest must re-
quire interference and the state must use means reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose).
61. 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084 (1980). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 4th 591 (1980).
62. 125 Ariz. at 388-389, 609 P.2d at 1088-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Clearly, this passage is fraught with due process language. The court
recognized that even though a public (or community) purpose may be
served in enhancing the value of the condominium project, such ac-
tion by the council of co-owners does not outweigh the fundamental
property rights of the individual unit owners.
In Juno By The Sea North Condominium Association, Inc. v. Man-
fredonia,63 twenty of seventy unit owners each paid $2,000 for the ex-
clusive right to use twenty covered parking spaces in the common
area of the condominium. When all of the units were sold, there
were an insufficient number of uncovered parking spaces. The asso-
ciation board passed a rule assigning one parking space to each unit
owner who did not already own one of the twenty covered spaces.
The twenty unit owners filed suit to enjoin the rule, arguing that all
seventy owners must have equal access to the common parking lot
area. The court, however, found the rule to be reasonable and
logical:
We believe the regulation challenged herein is not only fair but makes good
sense. Upon construction by Juno by the Sea, there were 70 parking spaces
provided to unit owners in the immediate area of the condominium building.
For an extra $2,000 each, 20 unit owners were able to secure the best of these
70 spaces; i.e., 20 covered spaces in the basement of the condominium build-
ing .... In addition, the expense of maintenance of the covered spaces as well
as the open spaces is borne by the association. Under all these circumstances
we believe this plan not only makes good sense, but appears to be the only
reasonable alternative, short of total chaos, open to the association.6 4
In applying the three-part constitutional test to the parking regula-
tion, the court held that the the rule was legitimate even though
there was an infringement of a property interest in the common area.
The court explained that the rule was reasonably related to the asso-
ciation's interest in providing a workable parking scheme and the
regulation's minimal restriction on the individual owners' property
rights. Noting that the twenty unit owners already had parking
spaces secured, their interst in parking in the open lot did not out-
weigh the association's interest in making do with what parking was
available.65 Since the association's interest outweighed the interests
of the twenty unit owners, the rule was reasonable.
63. 397 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
64. Id. at 304-05.
65. See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n, 464 A.2d 952 (Me. 1983), where the
court held valid an agreement between an association and a resort hotel in which the
hotel held a long-term lease for the use of the condominium's swimming pool, tennis
courts and parking lots. Because the agreement did not increase or diminish the com-
mon areas or relegate any portion of the common areas to the exclusive use of any
condominium owners or of the resort hotel, the agreement in no way affected the per-
centage of undivided interest of each unit owner in the common areas.
See also Raymond, 662 S.W.2d at 89, dealing with the standard to be applied by the
court in reviewing an association's determination of a unit owner's pro rata share of
the "common expenses."
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Beyond rules governing the use of common areas, the due process
reasonableness test has been applied to rules governing the use of the
units themselves. In Wilshire Condominium Association, Inc. v.
Kohlbrand,66 the association asked the court to enforce a rule that
dwelling unit owners who have dogs may not replace the dog with
another after its death. The appellate court found the regulation to
be reasonable after engaging in a balancing test:
Certainly, the association is not at liberty to adopt arbitrary or capricious
rules bearing no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of
the various unit owners. On the contrary, we believe the test is reasonable-
ness. If a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; if not, it cannot. It is
not necessary that conduct be so offensive as to constitute a nuisance in order
to justify regulation thereof.6 7
Again, the restriction, on balance, had a greater benefit in promoting
"the health, happiness and peace of mind of unit owners living in
close proximity" than the detriment to the unit owner who lost her
ability to purchase a replacement dog.
The reasonableness of an association's action has not been re-
viewed by applying the equitable principle of "balancing the conve-
niences." In Monell v. GoUfview Road Association,68 a homeowners'
association constructed speed bumps in a private road over which the
plaintiff homeowner held an easement. The trial court used the doc-
trine of "balancing conveniences," which is applicable where a tech-
nical encroachment of another's rights is slight and the cost of
removing the encroachment would produce great harm and only
small benefit. Applying the doctrine, the trial court denied injunc-
tive relief. On appeal, the doctrine was held to be inapplicable be-
cause the association was found to have violated the plaintiff's
fundamental property right. "It is also important to note that the As-
sociation even representing a majority of the easement holders had
no right to substantially diminish the convenience of the roadway."6 9
In this case, the balance swung in favor of the individual
homeowner.70
66. 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
67. Id. at 630 (quoting Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 182
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
68. 359 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
69. Id. at 4.
70. Other cases in which courts have considered the "reasonableness" of associa-
tion action are: Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc.! v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1977); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d
B. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process consists of basically three rights: that the
individual has adequate notice that a hearing will be held affecting
his interest in property; that a fair and impartial hearing will be con-
ducted; and that the individual has an opportunity to be heard at
such a hearing.71 The Supreme Court has found that the procedural
requirements vary with the nature of the case and that competing
policy interests must be balanced to determine what process is due.72
Although the Court has stressed a flexible approach in assessing the
required procedures, it has consistently held that some kind of hear-
ing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his
property.7 3As the Court held in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.:
"the Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity
to present his case and have its merits fairly judged. Thus it has be-
come a truism that 'some form of hearing' is required before the
owner is finally deprived of a protected property interest."74
The issue in the condominium context then is whether the associa-
tion can adopt a regulation that infringes upon a unit owner's prop-
erty rights without affording that individual a due process hearing to
challenge the regulation. Some courts have held that such a hearing
is not required before the regulation is enacted.
In Majestic View Condominium Association, Inc. v. Bolotin,75 the
condominium declaration prohibited all pets of any kind, except one
dog or cat weighing less than 25 pounds. The Bolotins acquired a dog
which then grew heavier than 25 pounds. They later bought another
large dog. The Bolotins "permitted these dogs to run at will through
the condominium, frightening residents and creating a nui-
sance."7 6The dog owners refused to comply with an association re-
quest that the dogs be removed. Pursuant to the declaration, the
association sought an injunction. The trial court ruled that the asso-
280 (1979); Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 418 A.2d
1233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
See also Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App. 3d 527, 449 N.E.2d 151 (1983), where a
condominium unit owner wanted to purchase from another unit owner his large unit.
The association, however, held the right of first refusal on every unit. The association
exercised its right allegedly because it did not want the prospective purchaser to buy it
and move her children into the unit. The court found that the exercise of the first
refusal right must be rationally related to the protection, preservation or proper opera-
tion of the property and exercised in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.
71. M. FORKOSCH, supra note 56, §§ 181, 183, 186.
72. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
73. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
74. 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (emphasis in original) (quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)).
75. 429 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
76. Id. at 439.
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ciation acted arbitrarily and had failed to give the owner pre-litiga-
tion due process.
The court of appeals reversed stating that the association had met
the three requirements for procedural due process in condominium
rule enforcement situations. Those requirements are: (1) construc-
tive or actual notice of the existence of the restriction to the owner
prior to enforcement; (2) a reasonable demand for compliance with
the restriction after the breach has occurred; and (3) compliance with
the applicable procedural due process considerations which require
notice of the commencement of the litigation and an opportunity to
be heard.77 The appellate court found no support for the trial court's
conclusion that a condominium association must provide the unit
owner with an adversary proceeding before seeking judicial enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants.
While a pre-litigation hearing may not be required by due process,
courts have demanded that another element of procedural due pro-
cess-the element of notice-be satisfied before the association can
enforce a rule or regulation. In Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Rich-
mond,78 the sports club brought an action to foreclose on a lien
placed on a unit owner's property for failure to pay annual member-
ship fees.79 The court rejected the unit owner's contention that the
covenant to pay fees was an unlawful restriction on alienation of
property. "The imposition of a lien for unpaid fees is a reasonable
method of enforcing the terms of the covenant. The description of
the sports club and the relevant fees were set out in the articles of
the condominium declaration giving prospective purchasers adequate
77. Id.
78. 99 Ill. 2d 182, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (1983).
79. Article 15 of the Streams Sports Club Declaration states:
15.2 Membership in Club. Each Owner of any Unit in the entire Condomin-
ium Development shall, upon acquisition of title, by such Owner, become a
member of the Club, without any membership or initiation fee therefor. Each
such Owner may exercise and enjoy any and all facilities of such Club as may
exist from time to time, expressly subject and contingent upon the continuous
compliance by each such Owner with all By-Laws, rules and regulations as the
Owner of said Club may adopt from time to time, and the payment of any an-
nual membership fees and such other fees occasioned solely by the use of the
facilities of the Club by such Unit member, as may be imposed ....
15.3 Termination of Membership or Privileges... . All unpaid charges shall
be a lien against said Unit, subject, however, to rights of any mortgages on
said Unit. The Club shall have the right, in addition to any other remedy, to
enforce its lien by foreclosure ....
99 Ill. 2d at 186, 457 N.E.2d at 1229.
notice of their contractual obligations."80
In Snug Harbor Property Owners Association v. Curran,8 ' the
court held that restrictive covenants can be enforced only if they
were not so vague that the unit owner would not have sufficient no-
tice of conduct violative of the covenant. In that case, the association
brought an action to recover arrearages of annual maintenance fees.
The bylaws were written with "invalidating indefiniteness," the court
held.82 "Although [b]ylaws are, in a sense, a contract among the
shareholders, . . these fee provisions contain no clear standard by
which a court could determine which . . . facilities were to be main-
tained, or to what degree, and for this reason they are
unenforceable."8 3
Procedural due process also has been held to require that the asso-
ciation's board of managers conduct open meetings8 4 so that the unit
owners are apprised of any efforts to adopt rules and regulations that
would affect property interests.8 5
C. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies
to the condominium association in two major respects. First, it may
limit the association's ability to discriminate among prospective unit
purchasers, as by exercising its rights of first refusal to prevent a unit
owner from selling to a minority purchaser,86 or by discriminating in
the services it offers to its residents. Second, it may affect how the
association elects its board of managers. This second aspect has not
been tested through litigation.
The first aspect, the association's ability to discriminate among pro-
spective residents, was confronted squarely in White Egret Condo-
miniums, Inc. v. Franklin.8 7 A unit owner conveyed a half interest
to his brother. The association sought to set aside the transfer on the
ground that the brother had minor children, violating the express
covenant which prohibited children under the age of twelve from re-
siding on the premises. The brother argued that the restriction vio-
lated his rights to marriage, procreation, association, and to equal
protection of the laws. The court, however, chose not to treat the re-
80. Id. at 191, 457 N.E.2d at 1231 (emphasis added).
81. 55 N.C. App. 199, 284 S.E.2d 752 (1981).
82. Id. at 206, 284 S.E.2d at 756.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Davis v. Deerfield Lake Condominium Management Ass'n, Inc., 348
So. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-308 (1985).
85. For a discussion of the due process limitations on condominium conversions,
see Note, Fifth Amendment Takings and Condominium Conversion Regulations that
Restrict Owner Occupancy Rights, 62 B.U.L. REV. 467 (1982).
86. Wolinsky, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 527, 449 N.E.2d at 151.
87. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
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striction as it would a municipal ordinance. It thereby was able to
find no state action and no right to equal protection. The court held:
In the instant case, the restriction is not a zoning ordinance adopted under the
police power but rather a mutual agreement ehtered into by all condominium
apartment owners of the complex. With this 'type of land use restriction, an
individual can choose at the time of purchase: whether to sign an agreement
with these restrictions or limitations. Reasonable restrictions concerning use,
occupancy, and transfer of condominium units are necessary for the operation
and protection of the owners in the condominium concept.
8 8
Noting further that restriction on individual rights based on age need
not pass the "strict scrutiny" test of the equal protection clause, the
court said in this case that age restrictions are permissible where
housing complexes are specifically designed for certain age groups.8 9
While the court found the age restriction constitutional, it found the
association's manner of enforcement arbitrary and selective, because
at the time the brother purchased his interest in the unit six other
children under the age of twelve were lfiving in the complex. Given
the arbitrary enforcement of the rule, the court did not have to de-
cide the equal protection issue. Unfortunately, it did address equal
protection but failed to indicate whether the clause should be applied
to an association unit owner dispute.90
The constitutionality of association under the equal protection
clause also was challenged in Franklin v. Spadafora.91 In that case, a
condominium bylaw amendment limited to two the number of units
that could be owned by any one person or entity. The amendment,
presumably, was passed to prevent any investor from buying several
units and then leasing them to others for occupancy. On the date of
the amendment, the plaintiff owned six units in the complex and was
negotiating to buy a seventh. The trustees of the complex notified
the sellers that the sale was in violation of the bylaw amendment.
Franklin, the buyer, and the sellers filed suit to have the amendment
declared unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection
clause. They claimed that the amendment was "unequal" because it
discriminated against those who owned more than one unit.92 After
holding that the trustees had authority to pass the amendment and
88. Id. at 350.
89. Id, at 351 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976)).
90. For other age restriction cases, see Star Lake North Commodore Ass'n, Inc. v.
Parker, 423 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); De Slatopolsky v. Balmoral Condo-
minium Ass'n, Inc., 427 So. 2d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); O'Connor v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
91. 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983).
92. Id at 772 n.15, 447 N.E.2d at 1249 n.15.
that the amendment was rationally related to the trustees' purpose of
encouraging a stable population in the complex, the court disposed of
the equal protection claim as follows:
With this type of land use restriction, an individual can choose at the time of
purchase whether to sign an agreement with these restrictions or limitations.
... In these circumstances, we do not view the amendment as impinging on
fundamental rights of the plaintiffs.. . . Therefore, the amendment's limita-
tion to two of the number of units a person may own does not set up a classifi-
cation scheme requiring "strict scrutiny." . . . There is no question here of
"inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage."9
3
Whether the court would apply strict scrutiny if the bylaw amend-
ment discriminated against any of the suspect classes was left
unanswered. 9 4
The second application of the equal protection clause to the condo-
minium association - the one person-one vote concept for association
board elections - has not been addressed by the courts. The basic
argument is this: if the condominium is a municipal entity and the
association board is the government of that municipal entity, then all
of those affected by board action should participate equally in elect-
ing board members. All those affected include each person who lives
in the condominium community, whether a unit owner or not.
However, most if not all condominium associations provide for vot-
ing only by unit owners. 95 Usually units receive a number of votes in
proportion to their ownership interest in the condominium and to
their burden of the common expense. Other voting schemes are
based on the size of the unit owned, i.e., a vote for a certain number
of square feet of floor area.
While these voting arrangements may be based on the premise that
unit owners' investments are the only matters affected by board ac-
tions and, therefore, only unit owners should vote for board mem-
bers, it is clear that rules and regulations promulgated by the board
affect non-unit owning residents as well. A rule preventing the play-
ing of stereos after 11 p.m. or a rule prohibiting children from play-
ing in the common areas affects all in the condominium as much as
any nuisance ordinance or municipal curfew. Does equal protection,
93. Id. at 773-774 n.16, 447 N.E.2d at 1250 n.16 (quoting New Orleans v. Duke, 427
U.S. 297 (1976)).
94. Those discriminated against in housing can bring a claim under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982). See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1982), where a white tenant who charged that an apartment complex's adults only
rental policy was racially discriminatory had standing to raise its racial discrimination
claim only under the Fair Housing Act, not under the fourteenth amendment.
Where a condominium association adopts racially discriminatory policies, the associa-
tion board of directors may be individually liable. In Tillman v. Weaton-Haven Recre-
ation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975), directors of a non-profit corporation
which operated a community swimming pool could be personally liable for the corpo-
ration's refusal to admit blacks to the corporation's pool.
95. UNIF. CONDOMINIuM ACT §§ 3-103, 3-110 (1985).
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then, require that all those affected by the board action have an
equal vote in electing board members?
In Ball v. James,96 the Supreme Couit sent a warning to commu-
nity associations that they may fall under the one person-one vote
equal protection requirement of the fourteenth amendment. In Ball,
the Court considered whether voting may be limited to landowners
in electing directors of a large water reclamation district in Arizona.
The issue phrased by the Court was "whether the purpose of the Dis-
trict is sufficiently specialized and narrow and whether its activities
bear on landowners so disproportionately as to distinguish the Dis-
trict from those public entities whose more general governmental
functions demand application of the [one person-one vote] princi-
ple."9 7 The Court then found that the district did not exercise gen-
eral governmental powers and, therefore, was not bound by the
principle. The Court then listed those I powers it would consider as
evidence of a general government: "The District cannot impose ad
valorem property taxes or sales taxes. It cannot enact any laws gov-
erning the conduct of citizens, nor does it administer such normal
functions of government as the mainten!ance of streets, the operation
of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services." 98
Where the body exercises these general government powers and
"performs important governmental functions" that have a significant
impact on all citizens residing within the district, then the one per-
son-one vote principle is applied.99 If the condominium board of di-
rectors is vested with and exercises traditional and important
governmental powers, should board elections allow participation by
all of those condominium residents affected, regardless of whether
they own property in the complex?100 It can be argued that the con-
sensual relationship of the unit owner 'and association controls and
96. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
97. Id. at 362.
98. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted).
99. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-55 (1970).
100. See Washington ex rel Seattle Trust Co. V. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). See
also SANDS & LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAe § 9.02 (1981): "The determination of
when an issue statutorily committed to the electoral process in some form is of suffi-
cient 'general interest' to warrant strict equal protection analysis must, under the cur-
rent state of the law, fluctuate according to the circumstances of the particular case."
In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970), the Court said: "Presumptively,
when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision. . .. [the
fourteenth amendment] does not permit . . .the exclusion of otherwise qualified citi-
zens from the franchise."
In Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,, 627 (1969), the Court said that any
state statute granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis poses the "danger
that those who choose to live in a condominium impliedly consent to
live under an aristocracy or, in some cases, an oligarchy.
IV. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND THE ASSOCIATION
The fourteenth amendment only limits actions taken by a state
government or those acting under color of state law. There can be no
violation of the fourteenth amendment without a finding that state
action is present. i 0i Private conduct which abridges "individual
rights does no violence to the [fourteenth amendment] unless to
some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has
been found to have become involved in it."102
The state acts by three means: its legislature, its administration
and its courts. It can act in no other way.1 0 3 This is not to say that
an individual who holds no public office or employment cannot en-
gage in conduct under the color of state law for the purposes of "state
action." The Supreme Court has said: "When private individuals...
are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in
nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and
subject to its constitutional limitations."104
For a condominium association to be limited by the fourteenth
amendment, it must engage in state action. Unless the condominium
project is itself owned and, operated by the state, state action will be
found only if (a) the condominium association has taken on govern-
mental powers and is providing traditional governmental services to
its residents, with the approval and acquiescence of the state through
an enabling statute, or (b) the state, through legislation or through
administrative or judicial action, acquiesces or enforces association
action.
A. The Association's Governmental Powers
A private entity which engages in a function that serves the public
does not transform its acts into "state action."105 However, where
there is private performance of a governmental function, the Court
may find state action. In Terry v. Adams, 1O6 a private political party's
candidate selection process was struck down as a violation of the fif-
teenth amendment. Underlying the Court's holding was the fact that
of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substan-
tially affect their lives." Id (footnote omitted).
101. C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8:1 (1969).
102. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
103. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
104. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
105. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
106. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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the party's primary was the only effective part of the electoral pro-
cess determining who would govern the county.
Where a private corporation owns property and operates a "com-
pany town," providing traditional governmental services, state action
is present and the corporation's actions are limited by the fourteenth
amendment. In Marsh v. Alabama, 1 0 7 . the town of Chicasaw, Ala-
bama, was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. A company
rule prohibited the distribution of religious literature on the side-
walks. A Jehovah's Witness was arrested for trespassing when she
refused to leave the town after handing out religious pamphlets on a
sidewalk. The Supreme Court held that the woman's first amend-
ment rights had been violated. For the majority, Justice Black wrote:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public
in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it."108
Whether state action exists in the condominium setting does not
turn on the fact that the title to the condominium rests in private
hands. The inquiry by the court considers the degree to which the
private property owner has opened up his property for use by the
general public. As Justice Black wrote,,
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where
the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than
the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties
and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state statute.1 0 9
The town was performing with state action traditional government
functions because public ownership of the sites of the violation is not
necessary in finding state action and because Chicasaw had all the
characteristics of a town except public Ownership. So when the com-
pany town prevented free speech, the Court could find constructive
state action present.
A series of cases dealing with shopping centers may be illustrative
of how the Court would address the state action doctrine in the con-
dominium context. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc.,110 the Supreme Court held that a privately
owned shopping center fell under the state action concept of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court then held that the shopping
107. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
108. Id. at 506. Cf. Republican Aviation Corp.'v. Labor Bd., 324 U.S. 793 (1943).
109. 326 U.S. at 509.
110. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
center violated the freedom of expression rights of picketers by ban-
ning them from the area. Eight years later, in Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B,111 the Court overruled Logan Valley and held that the
owner of a private shopping center is not bound by the first amend-
ment. The owner was permitted to remove picketers from his sixty-
store shopping center. The Court disagreed with Logan Valley's con-
clusion that the "shopping center here is clearly the . . . equivalent
of the business district of Chicasaw involved in Marsh [v. Ala-
bama.]"112 The Court then cited with approval an earlier holding in
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner:
The argument is that such a [shopping] center has sidewalks, streets, and
parking areas which are functionally similar to facilities customarily provided
by municipalities. It is then asserted that all members of the public, whether
invited as customers or not, have the same right of free speech as they would
have on the similar public facilities in the streets of a city or town. The argu-
ment reaches too far. The Constitution by no means requires such an attenu-
ated doctrine of dedication of private property to public use [Contrary to
Marsh] . . . [i]n the instant case there is no comparable assumption or exer-
cise of municipal functions or power.11 3
If state action does not adhere to purely business entities, should
the Court find state action present in purely residential entities? An
argument certainly can be made that the condominium development
is operated more like a municipality (at least a residential suburb)
than a shopping center or mall. The condominium association makes
decisions that directly affect use of property, conduct of residents and
visitors and assessments paid by property owners. The shopping
center has fewer indicia of a democratic form of government. The
center is usually owned by a single entity and the stores are rented
by individual businessmen. A condominium is governed by a board
popularly elected by unit owners; the shopping center is usually oper-
ated by an individual, although shop owners may form a shopping
center association. Perhaps the most significant distinction between
the shopping center and the condominium is that people visit the for-
mer and live in the latter. When decisions are made affecting people
where they live, the decisions take on more of a governmental ap-
pearance. With government comes state action and the fourteenth
amendment.
B. State Involvement with Condominiums
The second avenue by which the court could find state action in
the condominium context is through state involvement in the condo-
111. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
112. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318.
113. 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). See also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980), where the Court held that nothing in the United States Constitution
prevents a state from requiring in its constitution that persons be given rights of free
speech in privately owned shopping centers.
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minium operation. Where the state significantly involves itself with
a private party, the acts of that private party may be viewed as state
action. Three major Supreme Court cases are frequently cited for
that proposition-Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,"i4
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,115 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 116
In Burton, a privately operated restaurant rented space in a pub-
licly owned parking garage. The restaurant refused to serve a black
man. The Court found that state action was present; the restaurant's
refusal to serve the man was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. In so holding, the Court pointed out
that the restaurant was physically and financially an integral part of
a public building, built and maintained with public funds. Because of
these factors, the state was viewed as a joint participant in the opera-
tion of the restaurant.
In Irvis, the Moose Lodge refused to serve the guest of a member
because he was black. The guest filed suit, claiming that the refusal
of service was state action because the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board had issued the Moose Lodge a private club license that author-
ized the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises. Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist said that the state's regulatory scheme
did not sufficiently implicate the state in the discriminatory guest
policies of the club. Consequently, the club's refusal to serve liquor
to the guest solely because of his race presented no fourteenth
amendment violation.
In Jackson, an electric company customer whose electric service
had been terminated without a hearing or notice claimed a violation
of due process. Although the Court found that the defendant utility
company was heavily regulated by state law and that it operated a
partial monopoly thanks to state law, no state action was present.
These cases indicate that the state must have some substantial, di-
rect involvement with the privately owned entity for state action to
be present. The mere fact that condominiums exist by virtue of state
law is not enough for state action. As the Court said in Irvis:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise pri-
vate entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private en-
tity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever .... Our holdings indicate
114. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
115. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
116. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
that where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have
"significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations" 
. . . in order for
the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional
prohibition. 1 1
7
Private conduct, in other words, will be viewed as state action where
the state and the private entity enter into a "symbiotic relationship"
in which the state has "so far insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence with [the defendant] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity." 118 Unless the state is provid-
ing special services or funding to the condominium, it would be diffi-
cult to find any symbiotic relationship with the state.119
Also, state involvement with the condominium, sufficient for state
action purposes, can be found where the condominium association
seeks judicial enforcement of a discriminatory rule or regulation.
Shelley v. Kraemer,12o where the Court held that judicial enforce-
ment of a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant in a deed was
state action, may serve as a limitation on the powers of condominium
associations. If an association must rely on court action to prevent
minorities from purchasing condominium units, to discriminate
against unmarried mothers or aliens, or even to place unreasonable
restrictions upon the use and alienation of individual units, the
court's involvement may trigger state action and subject the associa-
tion to liability.
Whether the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would find state action
whenever a court upholds a condominium regulation, so that another
court can then pass upon the regulation's constitutionality, has been
addressed by one court. In Franklin v. White Egret Condominium,
117. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 173 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
118. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
119. See Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV.
983, 1068 (1963):
Since states impose some regulation on almost every business and occupation,
and since it is difficult to articulate what makes the relationship "close," the
theory might be stretched to cover all activities which the state has power to
regulate. And the unsatisfactory experience with the "business affected with
public interest" test of legislative power to regulate, suggests it would be diffi-
cult to formulate a rationally defined narrowed limit of the proposed theory.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Court held that the mere fact that a
business is subject to state regulation does not, by itself, convert action into that of the
state for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment but, rather, the complaining party
must also show that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the chal-
lenged action so that the action of the regulating party may be fairly treated as that of
the state itself. Constitutional standards are invoked, the Court said, only when it can
be said that the state is responsible for the misconduct involved. Id. at 1002-12.
For a broader definition of state action on the part of private associations, see
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Little Rock, Ark., school desegregation case,
where the Court held that state action exists where the state participates through "any
arrangement, management, funds, or property." Id. at 19.
120. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Inc., 121 the Florida Court of Appeals said that private enforcement of
a condominium covenant did not constitute state action. However,
when the condominium association relied on judicial enforcement of
the covenant, "it invoked the sovereign powers of the state to legiti-
mize the restrictive covenant at issue. This court therefore owed a
duty to carefully scrutinize that covenant with a view toward forbid-
ding its enforcement should it fail to pass constitutional muster."'122
The case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which found
the restrictive covenant reasonable andl constitutional without ad-
dressing the issue of state action.123
C. Applying State Action Doctrine to the Condominium
In addition to the White Egret case, a few state courts have ad-
dressed the issue of whether state actio n exists where the condomin-
ium association takes action. These courts have reached different
conclusions.
In Franklin v. Spadafora,124 the Massachusetts court upheld a con-
dominium bylaw amendment against due process and equal protec-
tion challenges. To pass on the constitutionality of the bylaw
amendment, the court first "assumed" that the adoption of the
amendment constituted state action. This assumption permitted the
court to reach the merits of the case. -The court said: "Because we
conclude that the amendment did not .deprive the plaintiffs of any
constitutional rights, we may assume, without deciding, that the
amendment represents State action."12s Once the assumption was
made, the court then applied the due process rationality test, to hold
"that, '[i]f a [bylaw amendment] serves a legitimate purpose, and if
the means the [condominium association] adopted are rationally re-
lated to the achievement of that purpose, the [amendment] will with-
stand constitutional challenge.' "126 Whether the court would have
found state action had the bylaw amendment not survived the ration-
ality test is uncertain. The court, however, did point out that condo-
minium bylaws are similar to municipal laws and that "the test
employed in determining the constitutional validity of municipal by-
121. 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),, qffd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
122. Id. at 1089.
123. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). See supra note 87 and accompanying text for the
facts of the case.
124. 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983).
125. Id. at 773, 447 N.E.2d at 1249.
126. Id. at 774, 447 N.E.2d at 1250 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682,
421 N.E.2d 1181 (1981)).
laws affecting economic relations is appropriate to the present in-
quiry."' 27Such language indicates that the court viewed the condo-
minium as exercising governmental functions, such as the "company
town" in Marsh v. Alabama.12s
While state action is usually considered a threshold requirement in
a fourteenth amendment claim, courts facing constitutional chal-
lenges to condominium regulations have bypassed the state action
question to reach the merits of the claim. In Laguna Royale Owners
Association v. Darger,129 a California court was asked to decide
whether a condominium deed restriction prohibiting assignment or
transfer of a unit without approval by the condominium association
was a violation of the unit owner's freedom of association. "Prelimi-
narily, there is considerable doubt of whether the actions of the Asso-
ciation constitute state action so as to bring into play the
constitutional guarantees," the court said.130 It then proceeded to
find that the restriction did not abridge the owner's right to freedom
of association and to due process.
However, in Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Associationl3l a
District of Columbia court refused to consider the constitutionality of
an assessment scheme because no state action was present.
The Owens argue that their due process rights were violated by the assess-
ment schedule basing each co-owner's share on his percentage of ownership.
We fail to see any state action in the establishment of the assessment schedule
by the condominium and since the Owens voluntarily agreed to the schedule
when they bought a unit, any attempt to change it now should be by an at-
tempt to alter the declaration and bylaws by the processes provided for in the
bylaws. 13 2
Perhaps underlying the Owens court's holding is an estoppel or
waiver argument. The Owens possibly have constitutional rights to
due process as against the condominium association but, by volunta-
rily agreeing to the assessment schedule, they waived their rights to
challenge its constitutionality. In any event, where the court finds no
state action present, there is no constitutional inquiry into the
regulations.133
127. 388 Mass. at 774, 447 N.E. 2d at 1250.
128. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
129. 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
130. Id. at 683, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
131. 373 A.2d 890 (D.C. 1977).
132. Id. at 895.
133. The Constitution also comes into play in condominium cases where unit own-
ers are challenged on grounds of standing. This topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
See, e.g., Rouse v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. 912 (BNA) (Wash.
1984), where the Washington Supreme Court held that a condominium owner may
bring an action for negligence and breach of warranty in the construction of a common
area without joining the other unit owners as plaintiffs. The unit owner's interest in
the common area is "exclusive in nature," the court said, explaining that the interest
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V. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN REFERENCE
TO THE CONDOMINIUM
Before taking any action, a condominium association should con-
sider the unit owner's two interests. First, the unit owner has an in-
terest in his investment-backed expectations. The owner has risked a
substantial amount of capital and incurred a long-term mortgage debt
with the expectation of at least a reasonable return on his invest-
ment. Secondly, the unit owner has an interest in the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Every association action either
enlarges or restricts an individual owner's freedom of action and
either enhances or diminishes an owner 's return on investment.
It is not necessarily ideal for the association to only take action
that strikes a balance between the t~vo often competing interests.
Sometimes the situation may call for the association to steer hard to
the side of investment expectations at the expense of personal lib-
erty, e.g., enacting a "no pets" rule when the condominium is being
overrun by pet dogs. Sometimes personal liberty should triumph,
e.g., deleting a "no children" rule despite an adverse effect on prop-
erty values. What course the association decides to take is a matter
of personal preference and the condominium's collective policy.
However, action that steers the condo;minium too far toward either
interest and too far from the other subjects the action to judicial
overruling. If the action severely restricts personal freedom, the
court may deem the action unreasonable (under the rule of reasona-
bleness) or violative of due process or equal protection (if state action
is present). If the action severely harms investment expectations, it
may be deemed contrary to the association's statutory authority or vi-
olative of the condominium documents.134
of the other co-tenants will also be served by successful prosecution of the suit, result-
ing in the common area being repaired.
Other condominium standing cases include: Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States v. Tinsley Mill Village, 249 Ga. 768, 294 S.E.2d 495 (1982); Siller v. Hartz
Mountain Assoc., 93 N.J. 370, 461 A.2d 568 (1983); Brickell Club Condominium Ass'n v.
Forte, 410 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
134. Association action that severely limits the use or impedes possession of an in-
dividual owner's property could be considered a "taking" without due process if state
action is present. It is interesting to note that even if the action were to serve collec-
tive condominium interests, e.g., a prohibition on leasing units in order to preserve the
owner-occupied character of the condominium, such action might be considered a "tak-
ing" because it impedes the potential owner-lessor's individual investment-backed ex-
pectations. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
Generally, the association has a wide latitude in making decisions
for the condominium. Enabling statutes usually grant broad powers
to the association to take whatever action is necessary for the smooth
and effective operation of the condominium. The better drafted con-
dominium declarations and bylaws do not narrow this grant of power
and nearly any action by the association or its executive board can be
justified as promoting the general welfare of the condominium as a
whole and the unit owners' individual investments. However, despite
generous state law deference to association actions, it is clear that
federal constitutional concerns always take precedence. The question
then is when does the federal Constitution become involved in the
review of association actions.
This article has analyzed the similarities of the municipal corpora-
tion and the condominium development. Even though a condomin-
ium has defined geographical boundaries, has traditional government
facilities and services such as streets and security, and has an in-
dependent collective identity, it is not a municipality and is not an
arm of the state. The reason is that condominium residents have
consented to live in their development. It is this consensual relation-
ship that distinguishes the association from true municipal govern-
ment. The citizen has no choice but to live under the dictates of his
government, so he must have constitutional protections from the
abuses of government. The condominium unit owner, however, made
a voluntary choice to purchase in his development. The unit owner
voluntarily agreed to be bound by the covenants, rules and regula-
tions found in the declaration and promulgated by the association.
The unit owner impliedly agreed to abide by decisions of the associa-
tion which are designed to maintain and enhance the value of the
condominium project as a whole. In so doing, he indicated that he is
primarily concerned with protecting and enhancing his investment.
This consensual aspect of the condominium unit owner relation-
ship does not render the Constitution meaningless in the condomin-
ium context. The Constitution's basic purpose in terms of individual
freedoms is to protect the individual from the tyranny of the major-
ity. When the majority acts in a tyrannical fashion, the Constitution
is employed as a shield for the individual. The unit owner consents
to live in the development, but does not consent to tyrannical or un-
reasonable restraints on his property or activities. When the associa-
tion acts beyond the powers granted by statute and its documents, no
longer can the association claim that its actions are justified by the
consent of the individual unit owner. In such a situation, the associa-
tion is acting like a government, imposing its laws on an unconsent-
ing public. When the association takes actions that cannot be based
on the protection or enhancement of the condominium unit owner's
investment interests, then the actions should be subject to constitu-
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tional scrutiny.1 35
The unit owner's investment interests encompass all of the aspects
that affect the value of his property. Those interests include: struc-
tural improvements, architectural standards, freedom from nui-
sances, security and safety, upkeep of the common areas and the
financial well-being of the condominium association. The unit
owner's investment interests do not include: regulation of conduct
within units that has no external effects, unreasonable restraints on
the alienation of units and rules or restrictions that are applied to
some units arbitrarily.
These association actions that concern the unit owner's investment
interests should not be subject to constitutional scrutiny, unless state
action is present. These actions should be evaluated through the rule
of reasonableness. The rule of reasonableness measures the appro-
priateness of the association action by considering the plight of the
individual unit owner in the context of the entire condominium situa-
tion. There are no "fundamental rights" of the unit owner under the
rule of reasonableness; there is only an examination of whether the
association has unfairly dealt the unit owner a lousy hand.
Those association actions that do nof concern the unit owner's in-
vestment interests should be subject to constitutional scrutiny be-
cause the association is taking on a governmental role beyond the
consent of the individual unit owner. The powers of the condomini-
ums are granted by state law, but these powers are defined through
the consent of the unit owners. If the association exerts the maxi-
mum powers granted under state law, it is pushing itself as close to a
government as possible. In so doing, the association is risking a con-
stitutional review of its actions.
Court decisions have made it clear that by acting like a govern-
ment, the association will be treated like a government. To avoid an
upheaval by the constitution of the carefully drawn relationship of
the condominium parties, the association should exercise only those
powers necessary to protect and enhance the investments of the unit
135. One problem with applying the Constitution to association actions is the poten-
tial inappropriateness of some constitutional law remedies. For example, the unit
owner and association are initially bound by contract, but under a constitutional claim
the unit owner may be awarded attorney's fees and punitive damages - relief not nor-
mally available in contract actions. Also, constitutional adjudication of the reasonable-
ness of assessments may result in an injunction, possibly throwing the operation of the
condominium into chaos. See Rosenberry, supra' note 2, at 29.
owners and avoid taking action whose only purpose is to govern con-
duct of condominium residents.
Courts should not presume that the Constitution will be applied to
measure the validity of all associations' actions. Each condominium
set-up is different; there is a wide variety of condominium declara-
tions, bylaws and rules and regulations. Each association acts differ-
ently towards its unit owners. Some associations may be extremely
productive, meeting once a week and promulgating a steady stream
of regulations. Others may meet once a year and simply adopt a
budget and an assessment rate schedule. Obviously, both types of as-
sociations do not "govern" to the same degree and state action should
not be applied automatically to both. The state action requirement
must be found only through a case-by-case inquiry.
To determine whether state action is present in the condominium
context, the court should ask the following questions: (1) Has the
state, through direct aid or active participation, substantially involved
itself with the operation of the condominium? (2) Has the condomin-
ium association exceeded the powers granted to it under state law in
such a way as to usurp traditional governmental functions? (3) Has
the condominium association, acting within the powers granted by
state law, taken on a governmental role which is not primarily di-
rected to, and justified by, the protection or enhancement of the unit
owner's investment interests? If any question is answered in the af-
firmative, then state action under the fourteenth amendment is
present.
If state action is not found and the Constitution does not apply, the
court should resolve challenges to association action through the rule
of reasonableness. In such a situation, the court should consider the
following factors: the social good within the condominium served by
the association action, the impact of the action upon the unit owner's
investment expectations and whether the action was within the con-
templation of reasonable condominium unit purchasers at the time of
sale. This inquiry is a peculiar blend of constitutional law and con-
tract law. The test basically asks whether the utility served by the
association outweighs the harm caused to the unit owner, so long as
that harm was foreseeable at the time of the purchase of the unit.
The test cannot be one of merely gauging the intentions of the con-
tracting parties, because there are too many parties to the condomin-
ium "contract."
VI. CONCLUSION
While today's condominium development provides a wide variety of
government-like services to its residents, the condominium associa-
tion is not a government so long as it acts within the powers con-
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ferred by state statute and it acts to protect the investment
expectations of unit owners. Should the association assume a govern-
mental role beyond the expectations of the unit owner, it should suf-
fer the constitutional consequences. When the association acts like a
government, it should be treated like a government. In such a situa-
tion, the court should find the "state action" requirement of the four-
teenth amendment to be satisfied, and association action should be
tested under constitutional law analysis.
Otherwise, where the association acts within powers granted by the
state and acts for the protection of the unit owners' investments, the
constitutional protections against governmental actions should not be
applied. In that situation, the court should use the rule of reasona-
bleness and determine whether the association has acted reasonably
in promoting the good of the condominium society as a whole with-
out severely damaging an individual unit owner's property interest.

